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The performance of quantum key distribution (QKD) is severely limited by multi-photon pulses
emitted by laser sources due to the photon-number splitting attack. Coherent-one-way (COW)
QKD has been introduced as a promising solution to overcome this limitation, and thus extend
the achievable distance of practical QKD. Indeed, thanks to its experimental simplicity, the COW
protocol is already used in commercial applications. Here, we derive simple upper security bounds
on its secret key rate, which suggest that it scales quadratically with the system’s transmittance,
thus solving a long-standing problem. That is, in contrast to what has been claimed, this approach
does not seem to be appropriate for long-distance QKD transmission. Our findings imply that all
long-distance implementations of the COW protocol performed so far are actually insecure.
Introduction.—Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1, 2]
allows two distant parties (Alice and Bob) to distribute
a secret key despite the computational power of an eaves-
dropper (Eve). Due to channel loss, however, the secret
key rate of point-to-point QKD is fundamentally limited;
it scales at most linearly with the system’s transmittance
η for long distances [3, 4]. To mitigate this limitation, Al-
ice and Bob could use intermediate nodes together with,
say, twin-field QKD [5–8], satellite to ground links [9, 10],
or, in the long term, quantum repeaters [11–13].
Besides channel loss, device imperfections also severely
limit the performance of QKD. One main imperfection
are multi-photon signals emitted by laser sources gen-
erating weak coherent pulses (WCPs). Indeed, multi-
photon signals provide Eve with full information about
the part of the key generated with them by means of the
photon-number-splitting (PNS) attack [14, 15]. As a re-
sult, the achievable secret key rate of the standard BB84
protocol [16] with WCPs is of order O(η2) [17].
To enhance the performance of point-to-point QKD,
three main approaches have been proposed. The first
one is decoy-state QKD [18–20], where Alice uses phase-
randomized WCPs of different intensities. The sec-
ond solution uses strong reference pulses together with
WCPs [21–23]. Both options deliver a key rate of
order O(η), thus matching the best possible scaling.
The third approach is distributed-phase-reference (DPR)
QKD, where Bob performs joint measurements on the in-
coming signals. There are two main types of DPR QKD
protocols: differential-phase-shift (DPS) QKD [24–26],
and coherent-one-way (COW) QKD [27–30]. In the for-
mer, Alice’s bit values are encoded into the phase dif-
ference between two adjacent coherent pulses of equal
intensity. In the latter, Alice’s encoding is done by com-
bining vacuum and coherent pulses. Both options share
the practical advantage of a simple experimental imple-
mentation, while being probably robust against the PNS
∗ mcurty@com.uvigo.es
attack. Indeed, long-distance demonstrations of the DPS
(COW) protocol, beyond 200 km (300 km), have been re-
ported recently [26, 30]. The COW protocol is even used
in commercial setups [31]. Despite these promising re-
sults, however, the actual performance of DPR QKD has
not been fully established yet. For instance, in [32, 33]
it is shown that DPS QKD can provide a key rate of or-
der O(η3/2) in the high loss regime, given that the error
rate is sufficiently small. Also, a scaling almost linearly
with η is possible by employing a receiver able to check
coherence between randomly chosen signals [34–36]. In
the COW protocol, on the other hand, there is a big gap
between known lower security bounds, whose key rate is
of order O(η2) [37], and upper security bounds, which
predict a linear scaling of the key rate with η [30, 38].
In this Letter, we fill in this gap by providing ultimate
upper security bounds for the COW scheme, suggesting a
key rate at most of order O(η2), thus matching the scal-
ing of the lower security bounds [37]. That is, in contrast
to what has been claimed, this protocol does not seem
to be appropriate for long-distance QKD transmissions.
Our analysis uses a special type of intercept-resend at-
tacks, the so-called sequential attacks [39–41], which are
particularly suited to attack DPR QKD. Intercept-resend
attacks transform the quantum channel into an entan-
glement breaking channel and, thus, no secret key can
be generated [42]. In doing so, we explicitly show, for
instance, that all long-distance implementations of the
COW scheme performed so far are insecure.
Coherent-one-way QKD.—Let us start by introducing
briefly the COW protocol [27–30]. The basic setup is
illustrated in Fig. 1. Alice uses a laser source, together
with an intensity modulator, to generate a sequence of co-
herent states |0〉 |α〉, |α〉 |0〉 and |α〉 |α〉 that she sends to
Bob, with |0〉 representing the vacuum state. These sig-
nals correspond, respectively, to a bit value 0, a bit value
1, and a decoy signal. They are generated by Alice with
a priori probabilities P0 = P1 = (1 − f)/2 and Pd = f ,
respectively, for a given f . At Bob’s side, a beamsplitter
of transmittance tB distributes the incoming signals into
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FIG. 1. Schematic description of the COW protocol. Alice
sends Bob a sequence of coherent states |0〉 |α〉, |α〉 |0〉 and
|α〉 |α〉 that she selects at random each given time. Bob pas-
sively distributes the incoming signals into the data line and
the monitoring line by means of a beamsplitter of transmit-
tance tB. The data line generates the raw key, while the mon-
itoring line checks for eavesdropping. This is done by using
a Mach-Zehnder interferometer that measures the coherence
between adjacent pulses. In the figure: IM, intensity modu-
lator; ∆t, time delay between adjacent pulses; Dd, DM1 and
DM2, single-photon detectors.
two lines: the data line and the monitoring line. The
former measures the arrival time of each signal with the
detector Dd. This allows Bob to perfectly discriminate
between the bit states |0〉 |α〉 and |α〉 |0〉; it is used to gen-
erate the raw key. If he observes a “click” in Dd in say the
first (second) time slot within a signal, he assigns to it a
bit value 0 (1). If he observes a “click” in both time slots,
this event is assigned to a random bit value. Once the
quantum communication phase of the protocol finishes,
Bob announces over an authenticated classical channel
which signals produced a “click” in Dd without disclos-
ing the particular time slot where the “click” occurred.
For each of these signals, Alice informs Bob whether it
belongs to a key generation round (i.e., it corresponds to
|0〉 |α〉 or |α〉 |0〉), in which case Bob keeps his result as
a sifted key bit, or it belongs to a parameter estimation
round (i.e., it corresponds to |α〉 |α〉). On the other hand,
the monitoring line measures the coherence between ad-
jacent non-empty pulses to check for eavesdropping. This
is done with a Mach-Zehnder interferometer followed by
two detectors, DM1 and DM2. The interferometer applies
a one-pulse delay ∆t to one of its arms and is prepared
such that adjacent coherent states |α〉 cannot produce
a “click” in say detector DM2. Bob also reveals the in-
formation about the “clicks” that occur in the detectors
DM1 and DM2. Errors in the data line are characterized
by the quantum bit error rate (QBER), while those in
the monitoring line are quantified with the visibilities
Vs =
pclick(DM1|s)− pclick(DM2|s)
pclick(DM1|s) + pclick(DM2|s) , (1)
with s ∈ S = {“d”, “01”, “0d”, “d1”, “dd”}. Here,
pclick(DMi|s) is the conditional probability that detector
DMi “clicks” given that the two adjacent states |α〉 come
from the sequence s sent by Alice. A sequence s = “d”
corresponds to a decoy signal (i.e., |α〉 |α〉), a sequence
s = “01” corresponds to a bit 1 signal followed by a bit 0
signal (i.e., |0〉 |α〉 |α〉 |0〉), and the other sequences s ∈ S
are defined similarly. Finally, Alice and Bob estimate the
QBER and correct their sifted key bit strings. Also, they
apply a privacy amplification step (which depends on the
estimated visibilities Vs) to distill a secret key.
Upper security bounds.—So far, upper bounds on the se-
cret key rate of the COW protocol have been established
by considering mainly collective attacks [30, 38]. That
is, they assume that Eve attacks each of Alice’s signals
independently from each other, and she uses the same in-
dividual strategy to interact with each of them. This ap-
proach provides bounds that scale linearly with η [30, 38].
Below, we derive tighter upper bounds on the per-
formance of the COW scheme by using a special type
of intercept-resend attacks, the so-called sequential at-
tacks [39–41]. Importantly, in a sequential attack Eve
decides jointly the signals that she sends to Bob. Pre-
cisely, such signals can now depend on all the measure-
ment results obtained by Eve after measuring all the sig-
nals emitted by Alice. This property makes these attacks
particularly suited to attack DPR QKD [39–41]. Further-
more, Eve can take advantage of two special properties
of Alice’s signals in the COW protocol. First, they are
linearly independent. This means that she could use an
unambiguous state discrimination (USD) strategy [43–
45] to distinguish the signals |0〉 |α〉, |α〉 |0〉 and |α〉 |α〉
without introducing any error [46]. And, second, Alice’s
signals contain the vacuum state, which breaks the co-
herence between adjacent pulses. That is, in contrast
to DPS QKD, here Eve could send Bob blocks of sig-
nals, separated by vacuum states, without reducing the
visibility. Indeed, she only needs to maintain the coher-
ence between those consecutive non-empty pulses sent by
Alice that she resends to Bob. As we will show below,
thanks to these properties together, it turns out that for
any value of α, there is always a loss regime in which
the signals sent by Eve result in QBER=0 and Vs = 1
for all s ∈ S. Moreover, we remark that intercept-resend
attacks do not allow the distribution of a secure key [42].
Next, we describe briefly a slightly simplified version
of the sequential attack that we consider, which already
captures its main features. A detailed description of
the attack and the parameters that Eve can tune can
be found in the Supplemental Material. In particular,
Eve first measures each signal emitted by Alice with a
measurement strategy which resembles that introduced
in [48, 49]. That is, her measurement lies between the
so-called minimum error discrimination (MED) strat-
egy [50, 51], and the USD strategy [43–45]. Each mea-
surement provides Eve four possible outcomes, i.e., either
it identifies Alice’s state or it provides an inconclusive
result. The probability of this latter event, which we
shall call qinc, depends on the overall system loss, and
is selected a priori by Eve to reproduce the expected
gain at Bob’s data line (i.e., the probability that Bob
observes a detection event per signal sent by Alice). For
any given value of qinc, Eve’s measurement minimizes the
error probability to distinguish Alice’s states conditioned
3on outputting a conclusive result. This implies that, in
the limit where qinc = 0 (qinc ≥ qusd), her measurement
matches the MED (USD) strategy, with qusd < 1 being
the failure probability of the optimal USD measurement
able to distinguish Alice’s states. See the Supplemental
Material for a detailed description of Eve’s measurement.
Once Eve has measured all the signals emitted by Al-
ice, she prepares new signals that she sends to Bob. For a
given value of the gain at Bob’s side, her goal is to min-
imize (maximize) the QBER (visibilities Vs). For this,
she proceeds as follows. Whenever her measurement re-
sult is inconclusive, or the number of consecutive con-
clusive measurement results is below a certain threshold
value, say Mmin, Eve sends Bob vacuum signals to avoid
errors. Note that in the conservative untrusted device
scenario, where Eve can modify the parameters of Bob’s
detectors (particularly their detection efficiency and dark
count rate), vacuum signals do not produce a “click” at
Bob’s side. On the other hand, if the number of con-
secutive conclusive measurement results is greater than
or equal to Mmin, she sends Bob a sequence of signals
that may contain non-empty pulses via a lossless chan-
nel. These signals correspond in principle to the results
obtained with her measurements but could be slightly ad-
justed. Precisely, depending on the expected gain, Eve
may optimize the intensity |β|2 of the non-empty pulses
she sends Bob to enhance the probability that he de-
tects them. Moreover, Eve might slightly process each
sequence of signals before she sends it to Bob to increase
the resulting visibilities, as we explain below. This is
because even if a sequence of signals prepared by Eve
perfectly matches that emitted by Alice (except for the
intensity), only those sequences whose first (last) signal
is |β〉 |0〉 (|0〉 |β〉) can guarantee perfect visibility results
at Bob’s side. Note that, as already explained, Alice and
Bob only check coherence between adjacent non-empty
pulses, and the presence of a vacuum state in |β〉 |0〉
(|0〉 |β〉) breaks the coherence between this signal and
the preceding (following) one. This means, in particu-
lar, that to improve the visibilities Eve should favor the
transmission of those blocks of signals which start (end)
with the signal |β〉 |0〉 (|0〉 |β〉). For this, with probability
qp Eve selects the largest subsequence of signals (within
the original sequence) whose first (last) signal is |β〉 |0〉
(|0〉 |β〉) and sends this sequence to Bob (after adding
the necessary vacuum signals), while, with probability
1 − qp, she directly sends Bob the original sequence of
signals without making any adjustment. In doing so,
Eve can use the parameter qp to tune the gain and visi-
bilities observed by Bob. Precisely, by increasing qp Eve
can decrease (increase) Bob’s gain (visibilities Vs).
We find, therefore, that for those values of the gain
which can be reproduced by Eve by selecting qinc ≥ qusd
and qp = 1, her attack achieves QBER=0 and Vs = 1 for
all s ∈ S. We call this scenario the perfect USD regime.
For higher values of the gain, Eve can optimize the pa-
rameters of her attack to minimize (maximize) the QBER
(visibilities Vs) observed by Bob. We refer the reader to
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FIG. 2. QBER and visibilities versus gain at Bob’s side in the
sequential attack considered. The stars represent experimen-
tal data from [29] (Subfigure (a)) and [30] (Subfigure (b)). In
Subfigure (a), V0d = Vd1, Vd ≈ Vdd, and the uncertainty bars
shown in one graphic match the information provided in [29].
In Subfigure (b), Vave refers to the average visibility [52] con-
sidered in [30]. Also, the two lines correspond to those ex-
periments using the weakest and the strongest intensity |α|2.
For other experiments, the results lie exactly between these
two lines, and are omitted for simplicity.
the Supplemental Material for analytical expressions of
the resulting gain, QBER and visibilities Vs as a function
of Eve’s parameters.
Evaluation.—We first apply the sequential attack intro-
duced above to the long-distance experimental implemen-
tations of the COW protocol reported in [29, 30]. After-
4ward, we evaluate a simple upper bound on its secret key
rate, K, which suggests a scaling of order O(η2).
In Fig. 2 we show the QBER and visibilities which are
achievable by Eve, as a function of the gain at Bob’s
side, for the different experiments in [29, 30]. For this,
we optimize numerically the analytical expressions that
describe Eve’s attack over all parameters controlled by
Eve. Precisely, in Fig. 2(a) (Fig. 2(b)) we maximize the
minimum value of all the visibilities Vs (the average vis-
ibility Vave). We note that the experiments in [30] only
consider the average visibility Vave, which is defined by
using a weighted combination of the conditional detection
probabilities pclick(DMi|s) [52]. Due to the symmetry of
Alice’s signal states as well as Eve’s attack, it turns out
that V0d = Vd1. Moreover, as a result of the numerical
optimization, we find that the results in Fig. 2(a) satisfy
Vd ≈ Vdd (i.e., these visibilities cannot be distinguished
with the resolution of the figure), though this is not true
in general. As expected, when the gain at Bob’s side
decreases, the achievable QBER by Eve also decreases
and the visibilities Vs increase, till they reach the perfect
USD regime where QBER= 0 and Vs = 1 for all s ∈ S.
Importantly, this latter regime is reached very rapidly by
Eve (i.e., for relatively large values of the gain) unless
Alice selects the amplitude α of her signals very small
(which in turn significantly reduces the secret key rate).
Indeed, by decreasing α, Alice’s signals become less or-
thogonal to each other, which means that Eve must in-
crease qinc to be able to distinguish them unambiguously.
In turn, this reduces the maximum value of the gain at
which the perfect USD regime is possible. Each partic-
ular experimental implementation reported in [29, 30] is
indicated in Fig. 2 with a star symbol both in the QBER
and visibilities’ graphics. These implementations range
from 100 km to 250 km (104 km to 307 km) in [29] ([30]).
A complete description of all parameters characterizing
these experiments can be found in the Supplemental Ma-
terial. Importantly, Fig. 2 suggests that all experimental
implementations in [29, 30] are insecure, as their exper-
imental QBER value (visibilities) is (are) above (below)
the achievable values by Eve’s sequential attack.
Similarly, if we compare the performance of the sequen-
tial attack above with the upper bounds derived in [38],
which only consider collective two-pulse attacks, it can
be shown that [38] significantly overestimates the gain
region where the COW protocol could be secure at all.
See the Supplemental Material for further details.
Finally, we use the sequential attack studied to obtain
an explicit upper security bound on the secret key rate
K of the COW protocol. Our starting point is a trivial
upper bound on K, which is the probability that Alice
sends Bob a bit signal state and he observes a “click” in
his data line. That is, it holds that
K ≤ (1− f)
[
1− e−ηtB|α|2
]
< ηtB|α|2 < η|α|2. (2)
In the second inequality we use the fact that f > 0 and
[1−exp (−ηtB|α|2)] ≤ ηtB|α|2, while in the third inequal-
ity we exploit that tB < 1. The next step is to determine
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FIG. 3. Upper bound R on the secret key rate K of the COW
protocol as a function of the system’s transmittance η. The
value of R corresponding to the case Qth = 0 and V th = 1
(Qth = 0.05 and V th = 0.95) is illustrated by blue (yellow)
stars. Both cases basically overlap each other for small values
of η. For comparison, the figure includes as well the lines
equal to η (red solid line) and η2 (green dashed line).
the maximum value of |α|2, which we shall call |αmax|2.
Precisely, for a given value of the gain at Bob’s side and
for given threshold values of the QBER and visibilities,
say Qth and V th, we use the analytical expressions char-
acterizing Eve’s attack to search numerically for the max-
imum intensity |αmax|2 such that the sequential attack
above is unsuccessful. That is, we require that whenever
|α|2 ≤ |αmax|2, the QBER and visibilities produced by
Eve’s attack do not simultaneously satisfy QBER≤ Qth
and Vs ≥ V th for all s ∈ S. Conversely, this implies that
if |α|2 > |αmax|2 then Eve’s attack is successful. Given
|αmax|2, and using Eq. (2), we have that
K < η|αmax|2 ≡ R. (3)
This upper bound is illustrated in Fig. 3 for the cases
Qth = 0 and V th = 1, and Qth = 0.05 and V th = 0.95.
The corresponding values of |αmax|2 can be found in the
Supplemental Material; they decrease linearly with the
system’s transmittance η. We find, therefore, that in
both cases R scales quadratically with η, as explicitly
shown in Fig. 3.
Conclusion.—We have derived simple upper security
bounds for coherent-one-way (COW) quantum key distri-
bution (QKD). They exploit sequential attacks and the
fact that Alice’s signals are linearly independent and,
moreover, they contain vacuum states, which naturally
break the coherence between adjacent pulses. By using a
simple eavesdropping strategy, we have explicitly shown
that all long-distance implementations of the COW pro-
tocol reported so far appear to be insecure. Most im-
portantly, our results suggest that the key rate of this
protocol scales at most quadratically with the system’s
transmittance, given that Alice and Bob only monitor
the QBER and visibilities. This renders this scheme in-
appropriate for long-distance quantum communications.
Note added.—We shared the finished manuscript with ID
Quantique before its submission for publication. The
5company stated that their commercial QKD products
based on the COW protocol run on relatively short dis-
tances and use a sufficiently weak mean number of pho-
tons, such that they can detect sequential attacks. How-
ever, the value of mean number of photons employed
would not allow ID Quantique products to detect sequen-
tial attacks if the distances were much larger than their
present limit.
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